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ON PARMENIDES'  
THREE WAYS OF INQUIRY

We often take Parmenides to distinguish three "ways of inquiry" in his poem: the way of being, that of not being, and the way which combines being and not being; and to hold that of these only the first is to be followed.

This approach, originating in Reinhardt,<sup>1</sup> is now canonical.<sup>2</sup> G.E.L. Owen, for example, writes that Parmenides aims to rule out two wrong roads which, together with the remaining right road, make up an exhaustive set of possible answers to the question ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν;... The right path is an unqualified yes. The first wrong path is an equally unqualified no. . . There is no suggestion that anyone ever takes the first wrong road. . . It is the second, the blind alley described in. . . B6, that is followed by 'mortals'. . . To take this well-trodden path. . . is to say, very naturally, that the question ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν; can be answered either yes or no.<sup>3</sup>

The text of B6. 1 - 5 is as follows:

χρή τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ' ἐὸν ἔμμεναι· ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι,  
 μηδὲν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· τὰ σ' ἐγὼ φράζεσθαι ἄνωγα.  
 πρώτη γὰρ σ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ ταύτης διζήσιος εἶργω  
 αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ' ἀπὸ τῆς, ἣν δὴ βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδὲν  
 πλάττονται, δίκρανοι. . .

and can be translated as:

What is for saying and for thinking must be;<sup>4</sup> for it can be,  
 while nothing cannot; I ask you to consider this.  
 For, first, I hold you back from this way of inquiry,  
 and then again from that, on which mortals, knowing nothing,  
 wander aimlessly, two headed. . .

Simplicius' manuscript, where this fragment is found, contains a lacuna after διζήσιος in line 3. Diels supplied εἶργω and took lines 4ff. to follow directly afterward.<sup>5</sup> Thus, the goddess seems to proscribe two ways of inquiring into being. This text, however, exhibits certain peculiarities which suggest that this view faces serious difficulties. The purpose of this paper is to present these peculiarities, discuss the difficulties, and to suggest, if cautiously, an alternative to the text and to the view it engenders.

## I

Leonardo Tarán, for example, discusses the problem of the referent of ταύτης in line 3.<sup>6</sup> We know that the second way the goddess proscribes, "the way of mortals", combines being and not being (B6. 5 - 6). The first way, to which ταύτης seems to refer, must therefore be the way of "pure" not being (cf. B2. 5). But αὕτη usually refers backward, to an antecedent already stated. Yet where, in lines 1 - 2, can we find a reference to the way of not being?

In answer, some scholars, for example Guthrie,<sup>7</sup> separate sharply between ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι in line 1 and μηδὲν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν in line 2. They argue that the former states the way of being, while the latter, that of not being. But, as Tarán replies,<sup>8</sup> "Nothing cannot be", far from being a statement of a wrong road, belongs essentially to the way of being, which was originally introduced in B2. 3 by such a double construction:

ἢ μὲν ὅπως ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι

If, then, ταύτης refers backward, it can only refer to the way of being. But why should that path be forbidden? To resolve this, Tarán postu-

lates a longer lacuna after διζήσιος than Diels had done. And he speculates that in this missing text the goddess says that she is setting that way aside "for the present" in order to discuss other matters. That is, the way is not proscribed but its discussion is temporarily postponed.

Tarán's positive view is rather confusing. At times he suggests that altogether there are three ways of inquiry (p. 61). But his considered view seems to be that Parmenides envisages only two: "This fragment [B6] is not a third way" (p. 72); "The *Doxa* is not a third way which combines Being and non-Being; there is no such third way" (p. 208); "The *Doxa* itself is the way of not being" (p. 230). Since, however, he refuses to identify the way of mortals in B6 with that of not being, he never explains which way the mortals take. At one point he writes that this is not a way of inquiry at all: B6 "does not assert that Being and non-Being exist", but simply "criticizes as the extreme of folly a doctrine that cannot even distinguish between" them (p. 72).

This serious unclarity aside, Stokes has raised a serious objection to Tarán's postulated lacuna. He argues that since line 4 contains neither a main verb nor a temporal qualification of its own, it must depend on εἶργω in line 3 and on whatever qualification εἶργω would have received in that lacuna. But this makes the asymmetry which Tarán intended to secure impossible: "Either the two abandonments are both temporary or they are both absolute."<sup>9</sup>

Stokes, who agrees with Tarán that two ways are proscribed in B6, but who believes that the proscription is permanent, needs to find a reference to another wrong way to which ταύτης can refer. His solution is to assume, with some evidence,<sup>10</sup> that the pronoun refers forward, to what follows it in the text.

The difficulty is that nothing in what follows ταύτης can be its antecedent; all we have is the second way, that of mortals. Stokes, therefore, is also forced to postulate a longer lacuna after διζήσιος, and conjectures that it contained a description of the way of "pure" not being. This is possible, though, we shall see, not without difficulties. Its main drawback is that it tries to make sense of the text by assuming that just what is needed for that purpose is just what is missing from it.

A less extravagant view is offered by Mourelatos, who also agrees that two ways are proscribed in B6.<sup>11</sup> He accepts the view that ταύτης refers backward, to lines 1 - 2, but denies that it must therefore refer to the correct way of being. He claims that ταύτης need not "refer to a route *explicitly* mentioned" (my emphasis). His view thus is that B6. 1 - 2 does after all contain a reference to a wrong way of inquiry.

Mourelatos argues first that B6. 1 - 2 does not only describe the positive way of being but also "the doctrine that sanctions it to the exclusion of the negative route". But this, he claims, is sufficient to secure an *implicit* reference to the way of not being.

Mourelatos claims that his interpretation preserves the parallelism between B6. 1 - 3 and B7. 1 - 3,

οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῆ εἶναι μὴ ἔόντα·  
ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα,  
μηδὲ σ' ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω. . .

For never shall this be proved,<sup>12</sup> that what is not is;  
but hold your thought back from this way of inquiry,  
nor let much-inured habit force you upon that way. . .

The fragments are supposed to be parallel in that both begin by recalling the doctrine which supports being and excludes not being: B6, positively, by approving of the way of being; B7, negatively, by rejecting not being. Both warn against two alternatives to being: B6, positively, through γάρ; B7, negatively, through ἀλλά. B6 distinguishes its alternatives positively, through αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα; B7, negatively, through μηδέ. The contrast ταύτης. . . τῆς of B6 is echoed by the contrast τῆσδε . . . τήνδε of B7.

Neither consideration is convincing. First, it is unclear how the goddess' expression of preference for the way of being at B6. 1 - 2, however explicit, enables her to refer to one of its opposites simply by the pronoun "this", which surely needs more solid referential support. In this respect, the argument of Tarán and Stokes remains undislodged.

Secondly, the parallelism between B6. 1 - 3 and B7. 1 - 3 is questionable. Though B6. 1 - 2 contains the doctrine which supports being and excludes not being (cf. B2. 7 - 8), B7. 1 - 2 does not. These lines simply assert the falseness of the way of not being without in any way justifying that assertion.

Mourelatos claims that the contrasts ταύτης. . . τῆς and τῆσδε. . . τήνδε are "weak" because he thinks that the two wrong ways finally lapse into each other.<sup>13</sup> Now if there is any contrast in B7 at all, it is weak enough for Parmenides to use the very same pronoun in referring to these two ways. But in B6 he employs distinct grammatical forms, and marks a forceful contrast. Again, the parallelism fails.

But is there a contrast between two ways of inquiry at all in B7? Though it is usually thought so, I cannot find it there. Apart from the

grammatical point we just mentioned, this view has a curious consequence which seems not to have been noticed. If B7 contrasts two wrong ways, it implies that reason takes the first (not being), while habit takes the second (both being and not being). Yet why should Parmenides think this? This peculiar correlation, which is absent elsewhere in the poem, does not fit with the grammar of the text. For the contrast expressed by μηδὲ seems to hold directly between reason and habit (εἶργε νόημα/μηδὲ σ' ἔθος) rather than between ways of inquiry. The juxtaposition of reason and habit suggests that we are warned against two different ways of falling into a wrong path, rather than against two wrong paths. The pronouns τῆσδε and τήνδε have the same antecedent, and the goddess in effect says:

but hold your thought back from this way of inquiry,  
nor let much-inured habit force you upon it. . .

We can thus account for the repetition τῆσδε. . . τήνδε in B7, as opposed to the contrast ταύτης. . . τῆς in B6, and also attribute a reasonable claim to the goddess. Accordingly, no parallelism between B6 and B7 remains.

Before we examine the consequences of this reading we must examine one more consideration against the view of Mourelatos, Stokes, and, indeed, against any approach that finds an injunction *against* certain ways of inquiry in B6.

The presence of γάρ ("because") shows that B6. 3ff. offers support for the argument in lines 1 - 2. Mourelatos claims that B6. 3 "reminds" us of the doctrine supporting being and excluding not being and that γάρ "introduces the injunction of restraint". Stokes, who takes B6. 1 - 2 to argue for the way of being, finds that "this argument is buttressed — whence the γάρ — by the exclusion of the two alternatives"<sup>14</sup>. Both thus suppose that the exclusion of the wrong ways supports the claim that precedes it. But, contrary to their view, what precedes this directly is not an argument about being, but the phrase τὰ σ' ἐγὼ φράζεσθαι ἄνωγα which is, therefore, what the phrase including the γάρ must support. But why should excluding the wrong ways facilitate considering the argument for the correct one? In reality, the order is precisely the converse, since that argument provides the grounds for excluding those ways. The logical connection should be that the argument be considered *in order to* exclude the wrong ways. But γάρ will not tolerate that sense. In fact, the presence of the γάρ suggests that as the youth considers the argument for the right way he must also think about (without accepting) whatever wrong ways of inquiry there are in order to see the truth of the former and the deceptiveness of the latter. This is, after all, what

is also suggested by Bl. 28 - 31, which tells the youth that he must learn the view of mortals along with the truth.

It begins to appear that our difficulties with B6 may be caused by the one assumption which we have not questioned so far: the idea that the goddess is *proscribing* certain ways of inquiry in this passage. We now turn to that assumption.

## II

So far, we have taken it that in B6 the goddess tells the youth *not* to do something, not to follow either of two ways of inquiring into being. Yet she only seems to mention one wrong way. Faced with this problem, we have, broadly speaking, two alternatives. Since the way of being is mentioned, we can try to find a suitable sense in which this way, too, may be left aside. Or we can insist that, despite the appearance of the text, a second wrong way is being excluded.

The first alternative (which is Tarán's) is to suppose not that the way of being is abandoned, but that its discussion is postponed. The second (that of Stokes and Mourelatos) assumes that the goddess has the same attitude toward the two ways she discusses here; since she wants to abandon the way of mortals, she must also want to abandon the other way, and therefore a second wrong way is somehow to be found in the passage.

The difficulty of finding a reference to such a way suggests that perhaps no third way is to be found in Parmenides. This is in fact likely on general grounds.

First, the overall structure of the poem is dualistic with a vengeance. There are just two parts, the *Alētheia* and the *Doxa*, and we know that the former demonstrates the way of being. It is thus to that extent plausible that Parmenides considers only one alternative to that way, which he discusses in the *Doxa*.

This contrast between truth and appearance is reflected in the contrast between the goddess' road (Bl. 23, 27) and the people's well-trodden path (Bl. 27), and in that between the truth the goddess possesses (Bl. 29, B8. 50 - 51) and the opinions among which mortals wander (Bl. 29, B8. 51). Most importantly, however, the goddess states unequivocally that there are *only* (μόναι) two ways of inquiry (B2. 2). By itself, this statement creates an intolerable inconsistency for those who find three ways in B6, and we cannot dismiss it as easily as the following comment suggests:

Though Parmenides has, [in B2], suggested that there are only two

“conceivable ways of inquiry”... it now appears [B6, B7]... that in addition to the true premiss there are actually two premisses that must be rejected.<sup>15</sup>

This view faces a further difficulty. Parmenides distinguishes between truth and appearance, the way of the goddess and the way of mortals. If he also distinguishes the way of being not only from the way of not being but from the way of both being and not being as well, how are we to relate the terms of these different contrasts to each other?

We can easily identify truth with the goddess' way and the way of being. Now B6 characterizes the way of mortals as the way both of being and not being: is this also the way discussed in the *Doxa*, as Reinhardt, Owen, and Kirk and Raven claim? If it is, then the way of not being, originally introduced in B2 as the only alternative to the way of being, is not discussed in the poem. In addition, we must now attribute to the goddess the following unreasonable procedure: she begins (Bl. 27ff.) by contrasting her way with that of mortals (i.e., on this view, being and not being); she now says (B2) that her way can only be contrasted with that of “pure” not being; she mentions this way again at B6. 3 only to drop it, and, without explanation or warning, returns to the combined way at B6. 4.

If, on the other hand, we identify the *Doxa* with the way of not being (so Burnet<sup>16</sup> and Tarán), little is said of the way of mortals. In particular, we will be unable to explain why it is not discussed in the detail promised at Bl. 27ff. and B8. 50 - 52.

Again, our problems spring from taking the goddess to proscribe certain ways of inquiry in B6, and this in turn depends on accepting Diels' supplying of εἶργω at B6. 3.<sup>17</sup> What is the positive evidence for this problematic emendation?

Diels supplied εἶργω because of the verbal resemblance between B6. 3 and B7. 2. In itself, of course, this resemblance is not telling.<sup>18</sup> But two other reasons are also relevant.

First, it may seem that Simplicius attributed two forbidden ways to Parmenides:

μεμψάμενος γὰρ τοῖς τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν συμφέρουσιν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, “οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταῦτόν νενόμισται κοῦ ταυτόν”, καὶ ἀποστρέψας τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς τὸ μὴ ὄν ζητούσης, “ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα”, ἐπάγει.

(78. 2ff.)

Tarán claims that this passage “proves” that Simplicius took Parmenides to distinguish two wrong ways. Stokes, more cautiously, writes that “Simplicius appears to hold that Parmenides rejects two ways” (p. 115). Nevertheless, the most natural reading of the passage need not attribute this idea to Simplicius:

For, censuring those who combine in thought being with not being, “those to whom being and not being seem to be the same and not the same”, and turning away from the path that seeks not being (“but hold your thought back from this way of inquiry”) he concludes. . .

Parmenides, Simplicius writes, attacks those who combine being with not being and turns away from the road that seeks not being. In the absence of other evidence, the most natural supposition is to take that those who make this combination are on the road of not being, and that only one wrong way is involved.

A second, more serious, reason in favor of εἶργω is given by the grammatical appearance of B6. 3. It seems obvious that σ' here is the elision of σέ; and since ἀπὸ commonly means “away from”, we are faced with the sentence-frame

I \_\_\_\_\_ you away from this way of inquiry,  
which seems tailor-made for a verb like εἶργω. In view of this, all other considerations become, quite rightly, secondary.

Yet σ' need not necessarily be the elision of σέ. In epic verse, of which Parmenides' is an instance, it can also be the elision of σοί, the pronoun's dative. For example, *Iliad* I. 170 - 171,

. . . οὐδὲ σ' δίω  
ἐνθάδ' ἄτιμος ἐὼν ἄφενος καὶ πλοῦτον ἀφύξειν,  
. . . nor do I intend,  
staying here dishonorably to draw booty and riches for you,

contains just such an elision.<sup>19</sup> And so, probably, does *Iliad* XXI. 122 - 123,<sup>20</sup> while Helmut Saake has recently adopted this reading for σ' in lines 18 - 19 of Sappho's “Ode to Aphrodite”.<sup>22</sup>

Since the elision of σοί is possible, the goddess may be saying:

I \_\_\_\_\_ for you from this way of inquiry,  
and now a significantly different interpretation of this line becomes possible. For it now appears that a verb expressing opposition is no longer mandatory. In view of this, we might construe our incomplete line as follows:

πρώτης γὰρ σ(οι) ἀφ' ὁδοῦ ταύτης διζήσιος ἄρξω.



The use of ἀρχειν, "to begin", with ἀπό is noticed in LSJ (s. v. ἀρχω, I. 2). Smyth considers ἀπό parallel to ἐκ;<sup>22</sup> ὑπό often suggests a point of origin, and Parmenides uses it in just that sense at B8. 51 to signify the beginning of the *Doxa*. In Homer it is sometimes used in parallel to ἐπί ("upon"), but always involving the notion of origin, as in the common expressions ἀφ' ἵππων or ἀπό νεῶν μάχεσθαι. It may then be that in B6 the goddess says:

For, first, I will begin for you from this way of inquiry,  
and then again from that on which mortals, knowing nothing,  
wander aimlessly, two headed.

That the discussion of either way can be a beginning echoes nicely B5:

ξυνὸν δέ μοι ἐστὶν  
ὀπόθεν ἀρξωμαι· τόθι γὰρ πάλιν ἴξομαι αὔθις.  
And it is the same to me  
whence I begin; for I shall again reach the same spot.

This "spot" is just the doctrine that what is not can neither be known nor said (B2. 7 - 8) or, as in B6 itself, that all there is to say and think is what is. The youth is asked to consider this doctrine, and to do this he is to hear the true way of being and the false way of not being, so he can realize how the doctrine supports the former and excludes the latter.<sup>23</sup>

The poem now acquires a remarkably clear structure. The goddess contrasts her road with the people's (B1. 27), but tells the youth that he must learn everything (B1. 28), not only "the heart of truth" but the opinions of mortals as well (B1. 29 - 30). She gives a preliminary specification of these two ways of inquiry in B2.<sup>24</sup> She warns against the wrong way, supporting her warning with the central doctrine of B2. 7 - 8. She asks the youth to keep that thesis in mind (B6. 1 - 2) because (and now the function of the γὰρ at B6. 3 finally becomes clear) she will, as B1 promised, *take* him through these two ways — first through the way of being, in the *Alētheia*, and then through that of not being, in the *Doxa*.

Fragment B6 does not therefore reject any way of inquiry. On the contrary, it says that the goddess will follow (demonstrate) two methods of inquiring into nature — and which is just what she does.

The vehemence with which the way of mortals is denounced is due to the fact that the youth will have to travel along it and because habit may make him want to remain there. As Odysseus protected himself against the Sirens, the youth must not allow the apparent attractive-

ness, the intuitive appeal, of this road to deceive him. The wrong road is exposed (cf. B8. 51 - 54, 60 - 61, perhaps B19) because the youth must take it yet not mistake it for the truth.

### III

Our interpretation implies that the content of the *Doxa*, the way of mortals, the way of not being, and the way which combines being and not being are all the same. To defend this last, and most problematic, identification I will assume, controversially, that Parmenides' "being" is neither existential,<sup>25</sup> nor both existential and predicative,<sup>26</sup> but fundamentally predicative. My view owes much to Owen<sup>27</sup> and to Mourelatos;<sup>28</sup> I have discussed in detail on other occasions the sense of being to which I appeal below in connection with those of Plato's doctrines, notably his view of self-predication, which have an Eleatic origin.<sup>29</sup>

The assumption is that Parmenides understands "is" in the very strong sense of "is what it is to be". Thus if he talks, for example, of what is wood, he takes it that he is talking of what it is to be wood, the very nature of wood. And if so, then his denial of generation (B8. 6 - 9) becomes more plausible. For to say that wood ever came to be is to say that what it is to be wood came out of something which itself was not what it is to be wood. And that, in turn, is to say not only that the nature of things is generable but that the very nature of one thing can be transformed into the very nature of another. But how could this be? To say that the nature of wood ever came to be is to say that something other than this nature came to be that nature. But "the nature of a thing" is the ultimate subject of predication. To say that it came to be out of something else is to postulate a further subject of predication. And this only generates the same problem. For whatever it was which changed proves to be not the nature of the thing in question (not, for example, what it is to be wood); and the thing which underlies the change, whatever it is, turns out to be the only unchangeable, and therefore real, thing. Lacking the Aristotelian doctrine of matter, which his own arguments caused to be developed, Parmenides could only conclude that whatever it is that things really are is itself unchanging. For if it changed in any way, it would no longer be what it is, and there would be no subject for us even to talk about. Concerned as he was with the very natures of things, Parmenides concluded, by generalizing from cases of this sort, that what is cannot not be. This means, for example, that what it is to be wood (if there is such a thing) cannot in any way, at any time, and from any point of view, not be wood. Nature is un-

changing. Whenever we observe change, we are still within the realm of appearance. If wood does change into ash, then neither wood nor ash are real, but only appearances unrelated to the unchanging reality of things. The way of mortals is the common-sense view that things can change, and the philosophical, Milesian, view that everything in the world is somehow generated out of an undifferentiated principle. Parmenides' response is to argue that such change is only apparent. Real things, things which are F in the strong sense of being what it is to be F cannot change. For to be what it is to be F, to be the nature of F, is to be F in every way and at all times. If such a thing changed in any way, it would cease being what it is, and thus what is (what it is to be) F would turn out not to be (what it is to be) F. But this is to say that what is is not, that being and not being are the same. And this is the result of saying of any subject, which is assumed to be real, that it is subject to change.

But why did Parmenides, after ostensibly outlawing this way of mortals, proceed to describe it in such detail in the *Doxa*? If change is impossible, because it involves saying of its subject that it is not, why does he devote so much time to detailing its workings?

Through a careful analysis of Bl. 31 - 32, Owen has shown that no "approximate" truth is accorded to the *Doxa*.<sup>30</sup> Why is it then introduced at all? Owen answers that Parmenides' purpose was "wholly dialectical". To me, however, it seems peculiar that Parmenides would construct a (totally false) cosmology only so that "no mortal will ever give an account which presents fewer violations of the laws of Truth"<sup>31</sup>. Parmenides seems to have constructed the *Doxa* with great care, and the suspicion lingers that he is competing with the φυσιολόγοι, that he is offering a theory of the world in which, in some sense, he believes. This suspicion is supported by Aristotle's testimony, which, though not unequivocal, often attributes the dualistic cosmology of the *Doxa* to Parmenides himself.<sup>32</sup> I now want to suggest that we can attribute such a cosmology to Parmenides and still respect Owen's sound arguments.

At Bl. 31 - 32 we read:

ἀλλ' ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεται, ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα

χρῆν δοκίμως εἶναι, διὰ παντὸς πάντα περ ὄντα.

Still, you will learn these things too, how what seems  
had to be real, being indeed the whole of things.

The mortals' error is described in the phrase ὡς . . . ὄντα. And this mistake is to confuse things as they appear with things as they are, to take

what seems for what is. We can thus distinguish two aspects of the question of the truth of the *Doxa*. We can ask either if the *Doxa* contains a correct description of phenomena or if any such description, however correct of phenomena, can be an adequate account of reality. We can now explain why Parmenides cheerfully constructs the *Doxa* despite the devastating proofs of the *Alētheia*. Unlike common mortals, he knows that the *Doxa* can only tell us how the world appears to be, and that the way the world appears to be and the way it is are totally distinct. The deceptiveness of the *Doxa* does not consist in its relation to appearance, which it describes (in Parmenides' view) quite correctly, but in its plausible claim that it is also a description of reality.

Parmenides then draws, perhaps for the first time in western thought, the distinction between appearance and reality: not only does the world appear to be other than it is, but the world that appears is other than the world that is. Parmenides' challenge (ἐλεγχος) to cosmology was not to argue that physics was impossible; this would be difficult to reconcile with his own relentless pursuit of it. His refutation consisted in arguing that cosmology only touches appearance, and not the world of reality, whose true description is in the *Alētheia*. He writes the *Doxa* because its falsehood consists not in its being a *wrong* description of appearance but in its being only a description of *appearance* and in its apparent claim to describe reality.

In writing the *Doxa*, and in using negative predications, Parmenides is not trapped in the paradox of having to say what cannot be said.<sup>33</sup> "What cannot be said" is not how things seem to be, something to the saying of which Parmenides devoted considerable enthusiasm. Rather it is that how things appear to be (and hence, he would have inferred, are not) is how they are. Any aspect in respect of which a thing changes is part of that thing's appearance, and hence no part of what the thing is. To think that things really change, would indeed be to think that what is not is. This is what cannot be said and what Parmenides never tries to say.

Parmenides' absolute distinction between being and not being, between reality and appearance, is thus an ancestor of the distinction between essence and accident. Instead of proclaiming wrongly, as we have often thought, the end of cosmology, he showed how, given its own assumptions, its field of application and its claim to truth was severely limited. In so doing, he also showed that philosophy was necessary to put physics upon the secure path of science.

## Notes

1. Karl Reinhardt, *Parmenides und die Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie*, (repr. Frankfurt A.M., 1959) pp. 18 - 32.
2. David J. Furley, "Notes on Parmenides", in E.M. Lee et al., *Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos* (Assen, 1973), pp. 1 - 15; W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. II (Cambridge, 1965); G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge, 1957); A.P.D. Mourelatos, *The Route of Parmenides* (New Haven, 1970); G.E.L. Owen, "Eleatic Questions", *Classical Quarterly*, N.S. vol. 10 (1960), pp. 85 - 102; Michael C. Stokes, *One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971). Hereafter, I shall refer to these works by their author's name.
3. Owen, pp. 90 - 91.
4. For this construction, see Furley, p. 11.
5. See Diels' comment in his apparatus to the Prussian Academy edition of Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* (Berlin, 1882), p. 117.
6. Leonardo Tarán, *Parmenides: A Text with Translation, Commentary, and Critical Essays* (Princeton, 1965), pp. 59 - 72.
7. Guthrie, p. 22.
8. Cf. Stokes, p. 113.
9. Stokes, p. 113. Stokes and Tarán both reject the attempt of Rosamond Kent Sprague ("Parmenides: A Suggested Rearrangement of the Fragments in the Way of Truth", *Classical Philology*, vol. 50 (1955), pp. 124 - 126) to avoid this problem by changing the order of the fragments. Cf. Stokes, p. 113; Tarán, pp. 60 - 61. Furley suggests (p. 10) that τούτης refers back to the specification of the wrong way of not being in B2. 5. But this is surely too far back for the reference to be understandable, especially since different subjects have intervened.
10. Stokes, p. 115, n. 27.
11. Mourelatos, p. 77, n. 7. All references to Mourelatos on this question concern this passage.
12. δάμνημι is not quite equivalent to "prove", but this does not concern us now. Cf. Mourelatos, p. 28, n. 27.
13. Mourelatos thinks that the two routes "amount to" each other, but insists that "the route of mortals cannot be identified with the negative route directly or *simpliciter*", p. 91, n. 47.
14. Stokes, p. 114.
15. Kirk and Raven, p. 271.

16. John Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, 4th ed. (London, 1930), pp. 183 - 184.

17. Diels' emendation has been accepted universally, with one exception, noted below (nn. 18, 23). Cf. Tarán, p. 61; Stokes, p. 114; Furley, p. 10, n. 29.

18. Cf. Nestor-Luis Cordero, "Les deux chemins de Parménide dans les fragments 6 et 7", *Phronesis*, vol. 24 (1979), p. 11: "La ressemblance qui existe entre 6. 3... et 7. 2... est indéniable. Mais il s'agit d'une ressemblance extérieure, donc trompeuse." Cf. n. 23 below.

19. Cf. Pierre Chantraine, *Grammaire Homérique* (Paris, 1942), p. 86.

20. Cf. Walter Leaf and M.A. Bayfield, *The Iliad of Homer* (London, 1968), vol. 2, p. 506. Cf. also W. Leaf, *The Iliad* (Amsterdam, 1971), vol 1, n. ad. I. 170; Georg Autenrieth, *A Homeric Dictionary* (Norman, Okla., 1969), s. v. σ' and Herbert Weir Smyth, *Greek Grammar* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), p. 23.

21. Helmut Saake, *Zur Kunst Sapphos* (Munich and Vienna, 1971), pp. 54 - 65. I thank Edwin Floyd for bringing this reference to my attention and for discussing this question with me.

22. Smyth, p. 371.

23. Since this article was written, Nestor-Luis Cordero has subjected fragments B6 and B7 to an exhaustive philological examination. His article, referred to above in n. 18, is extremely valuable. Given his examination of the manuscripts of Simplicius he prefers the reading of (elided) τ' instead of (elided) σοι as I propose. He, like me, considers that a form of the verb ἄρχειν is necessary to complete the sense of B6. 3. His own proposal is:

πρώτης γὰρ τ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ ταύτης διζήσιος ἄρξει

For you shall first begin from this way of inquiry.

I find the closeness of our views extremely gratifying, especially since the sense we attribute to the text is virtually identical.

24. These lines do not contain the goddess' full description of the two ways of inquiry. The μῦθος (B2. 1) which she wants the youth to carry back with him is the μῦθος of B8. 1 and the κόσμος ἐπέων ἀπατηλῶν of B8. 52. It is in B8 and the following parts of the poem that the ways are fully specified.

25. This is the view of Tarán, Burnet, and Owen ("Elcatic Questions"; he may have changed his mind by the time he wrote the paper referred to in n. 27 below). Tarán, pp. 33 - 35, gives more references, and Mourelatos, pp. 269 - 278, offers an exhaustive classification of every possible alternative.

26. For example, Guido Calogero, *Studi sull' Eleatismo* (Rome, 1932), who claims that Parmenides does not distinguish existence from predication, and Kirk and Raven. Montgomery Furth, "Elements of Eleatic Ontology", in A.P.D. Mourelatos (ed.), *The Presocratics* (Garden City, 1974), pp. 241 - 270, argues that Parmenides "fuses" but does not confuse existence and predication, and that his argument is plausible under either alternative. Furley, pp. 13 - 14, follows Furth's approach.

27. "Plato on Not-Being", in Gregory Vlastos (ed.), *Plato I: Metaphysics and Epistemology* (Garden City, 1971), pp. 223 - 267.

28. Mourelatos, pp. 47 - 93.

29. See "Confusing Universals and Particulars in Plato's Early Dialogues", *Review of Metaphysics*, vol. 29 (1975), pp. 287 - 306 and especially "Self-Predication and Plato's Theory of Forms", *American Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 16 (1979), pp. 93 - 103.

30. Owen, "Eleatic Questions", pp. 84 - 89; cf. Mourelatos, pp. 194 - 221.

31. Stokes, following Owen, p. 148; cf. A.A. Long, "The Principles of Parmenides' Cosmogony", *Phronesis*, vol. 8 (1963), pp. 90 - 107.

32. Aristotle often treats Parmenides as denying physics altogether e.g. in *Phys.* A2, 185<sup>a</sup>ff. Yet at *Phys.* A5, 188<sup>a</sup>19ff., he attributes a cosmogony to him. At *Met.* A3, 984<sup>b</sup>3 - 4, he grudgingly attributes to him a dualistic cosmogony, while at A5, 986<sup>b</sup>27ff., he suggests that Parmenides, "forced to follow the observed facts", accepts such a theory. At *de Gen. et Corr.* A3, 318<sup>a</sup>6 - 7, he attributes such a dualistic view straightforwardly to Parmenides (cf. also 330<sup>b</sup>13 - 19, 335<sup>b</sup>15 - 16). Interestingly, Joachim (*Aristotle on Coming-to-be and Passing-Away* (Oxford, 1922), p. 100) hastens to comment that Parmenides presents this theory as "prevalent, but erroneous", and follows Burnet in thinking that Aristotle attributes this view not to Parmenides himself but to the poem which Parmenides composed, referring to it by its author's name, much in the way a contemporary literary critic might proceed.

33. Furth, "Elements of Eleatic Ontology", pp. 269 - 270.