

Deconstructing Spaces of Myth: From Derrida's 'counterfeit' to Deleuze's and Guattari's  
'origami'

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**Abstract**

The article is an attempt to deconstruct the concept of myth as it is drawn out by a variety of authors as diverse as Vernant, Lévi-Strauss and Nietzsche. Specifically, it deconstructs the three-fold conception of myth, first, of 'closeness', exemplified by Vernant's structural depiction of Greek myth; second, its 'episodic' character, accentuated by Lévi-Strauss' 'savage mind'; and third, its 'heroic' performance opened up by Nietzsche's anti-Hegelian caricature of Dionysus –though Nietzsche himself acknowledged that a more fruitful approach to thought and life (or to the manner in which one thinks of life) is still required. Against the horizon of the triad of 'closeness, episode and heroism', I propose that a more fruitful way to interpret and understand myth is by recourse to its openness (rather than closeness); its eventual/differential character (rather than its episodic character); and its anti-heroism (rather than its heroism). To further promote this view I take up on three theorists that developed explicitly these three dimensions: a) Derrida's 'counterfeit' that gives an idea of what 'openness' means by pitching the non-reciprocal character of gift; b) Deleuze's and Guattari's 'origami' that promotes the view of an eventful spatial difference, rather than an episodic one; and c) Deleuze's 'difference-as-repetition' that criticises Nietzsche's heroic conception of myth, rather than accepting Dionysus' excesses.

**Key words:** myth • counterfeit • origami • repetition

## **Introduction**

Sigmund Freud in his study *Totem and Taboo* (1978) proposes among other things, that in totemic societies that insist to consider and take certain plants or animals as indispensable parts of their lives, and thus are unable to eat or kill them, talking about the unconscious is rather absurd –as the latter is only the background of certain psychological ‘illnesses’ of contemporary western societies, like psychosis, neurosis and hysteria. Taboo, on the other hand, holds an intermediate position in Freud’s argument, in that it asserts that so-called primitive societies find a way to consummate their libidinal intensities and energy through, for example, disobeying a taboo prohibition. What Freud suggests is that totemic societies are involved and produce a certain conscious *thing*, something lived by the primitives, without producing at the same time, what is known in the west as ‘fantasy’ or ‘illusion’ –though primitives may have certain illusions too! Substituting neurosis or hysteria for taboo and totem is not necessarily the only way to go on with myth. It is still, however, another way to interpret a mode of thought that was dominant in societies many years ago. Yet I propose that there is still a more prominent and fecund way to probe and make some sense of mythical spaces (of closeness, episode and heroism). If I am forced to follow certain western theorists like Derrida’s un-economic space (of counterfeit), and Deleuze’s differential space (of repetition and origami), therefore, this is in order to open myth up to and launch, and more importantly make space, for a remarkably, pleonasmatic, pluralistic, plethoric and generous mode of thought that defies closeness, episode and heroism.

Naturally, one is obliged to accept that a serious transformation took place, once the Greek mythic system (of Hesiod for example), a highly balanced and symbolic system of ‘living with others’, fell from grace and was substituted for the Aristotelian and Platonic rational and political views that were susceptible to reason, geometry and order. Nietzsche’s (1993) *Genealogy of Morals, Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and *Human too Human*, for their part, stand somewhere in the middle, that is, between Hesiod, on the one hand, and Derrida’s (1981) re-telling of Plato’s cave story and Gilles Deleuze’s (1994) genuine theory of difference, on the other hand.

In the following three sections, accordingly, I begin with the spaces of myth and the manner in which they have been represented by Vernant; I then take up on the romanticised and idealized spaces of myth promoted by Lévi-Strauss in *Savage Mind* in order to deconstruct the supposedly tragedy irradiated by Dionysus, a task executed more intensely and accurately by Nietzsche – Dionysus being an almost perfect equivalent of excess, irrationality, orgiastic love etc. In the second section, I take up on the manner in which Derrida (1992) elaborates and reflects on difference by way of the impossibility and openness of the system (of any system, even a mythical one) of gift (rather than letting difference being subjected to Vernant’s depiction of myth). In the last part of the essay, I follow closely Deleuze’s (1994) ‘differential repetition’, submitting Nietzsche’s Dionysus to a more productive model of writing power, difference and, eventually, theory differently, otherwise, elsewhere.

## Mythical Spaces<sup>1</sup>

Jean-Pierre Vernant (1989: 27) in his study of Greek mythology proposes that ‘within myth there is neither a homogeneous space, nor a linear time’ and this is why a structural model of interpretation is required in order to get along with Greek thought –a model in other words that is untimely. More importantly, as Vernant proposes what ‘structures myth is the ceaseless interplay between *Δίκη* and *Ἔβρον* (Vernant, 1989: 54), that is the interplay between two opposite yet intertwining and interdependent poles. Mythic thought nevertheless, despite being structured on the basis of these two poles, is still open to interpretation in terms of the function each of the levels of myth performs. In Hesiod’s *Ἔργα και Ημέρες* (Vernant, 1989: 58), for example, one of the things Hesiod means to communicate, that is one of his messages, is ‘that nothing is given for free and that one needs always to return something back’ (Vernant, 1989: 73) –in a tone that rather reminds Jean Baudrillard’s (1993) *Symbolic Exchange and Death*. Reciprocity, nonetheless, is at stake here. More importantly, the closeness of the system implied by reciprocity seems to be defiant of economic exchange, debt, economy and value, concepts, in other words, that haunted modern western thought, from Adam Smith to Marx. The symbolic in myth, therefore, is not simply about value, in the strict economic sense of the term, but about closeness, social relation, prestation, honour and the overall ‘worthiness’ or value of a person –as was shown, however differently and in all their diverse manners, by Bataille (1991), Mauss (1954), Malinowski (1922), and Durkheim (1957), among others.

Unlike the symbolic closeness of myth, however, as Vernant proposes, ‘in Plato’s time, it is philosophy and its rationale that have come to take over the place of myth’ (Vernant, 1989: 73) –this was not of course a single movement exclusively at Plato’s jurisdiction or disposal. Yet, what philosophy, did after all, to myth, and it did it in so many ways and so perfectly well, is to deny the sort of reciprocity and closeness normally found in any mythic representation and spatial organization [see also Richard Rorty’s (1980) objections to the sort of mirroring implied by Plato’s, Kant’s and even Marx’s epistemologies]. For example, one finds in myth a stability promoted by the interaction and existence of dualities like *Εστία* and its opposite often known by the name *Ερμις* (Vernant, 1989: 199-202). That sort of reciprocity (to be found in the myth of Hesiod too) is effectively lacking in Plato’s philosophy. According to Vernant (1989: 222), moreover, what is particularly lacking in philosophy but exists in mythical discourses is exactly ‘the structural polarity portrayed by *Ερμής* and *Εστία*’. Unlike the closeness of myth, therefore, with Plato’s philosophy a new spatial order is introduced that obeys the logic of order, geometry and measurement (Vernant, 1989: 258).

If myth in Vernant’s manner of telling the story is a closed but balanced system of reciprocity, in Lévi-Strauss (1977) portrayal of ‘savage mind’ a similar mythic system

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<sup>1</sup> Single quotation marks (‘) are used when the translation from the Greek is my own, and thus is slightly and rather freely modified.

is unfolded but in a rather different way. Now it is the ‘part’ that counts. Arguably, primitive minds are not that simple, nor inadequate nor non-scientific or superstitious and irrational. Rather primitive minds stand for an altogether different way of going along the lines of knowledge and rationality. It is about a mode of thought that is neither less important nor less precise or objective from rational-scientific thought. Rather it is episodic, fragmentary and divided. As Lévi-Strauss (1977: 114) puts it, ‘myths present as their most important offer, the preservation till the present days, of ways of observation and reflection that used to be (and still are) explicitly adjusted to the discoveries of a certain type [...] a type of intellectual practise or a *techné*’. Typically, therefore, in Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism, myth becomes the episteme of the ‘specific’ and the ‘particular’. Additionally, however its role is adamantly more important. Indeed, it does more than that. For example, while it draws and depends on a variety of existing parts and materials, it combines them in a manner that produces a new more simple, but still sophisticated order. Primitive minds, in short, work with every possible material. But they do so fast. And, more importantly, they improvise. Primitives, thus, according to a well-known by now metaphor of Lévi-Strauss, are not *just* engineers. They are rather *bricoleurs*. A primitive mind, in short, does not transform nature; it adores it; and it lives not only *in it* but *of it*. In the light of this, ‘myth always produces structured sums not by directly referring to other sums, but by using remnants or episodes of already existing relations’ (Lévi-Strauss, 1977: 119).

Now having said that, unlike closeness and episode, Nietzsche’s depiction of myth is a rather heroic one. In his *Human too Human* [HTH] study, he proposes that the philosopher should never rest. For he needs to ceaselessly, do and undo what was solid or was taken for granted, through a critical examination of the values and truths bequeathed by a manner of thought that is no longer dominant and belongs, by and large, to the theological past. Heroism in Nietzsche’s thought, in other words, is not necessarily in line with myth, but it certainly reminds something of the ideal of Hesiod’s closeness portrayed by Vernant, who complained about Plato’s rationale replacing myth’s totality, and reminds something too, of Lévi-Strauss’ depiction of ‘savage mind’, who complained about erroneously comparing myth and science as two phases of human’s mind evolution, rather than taking them as two separate but equal phases of human thought.

Programmatically, heroism in Nietzsche’s thought, means simply and purely, to ‘explore historically why there is no such thing as an eternal or an absolute truth’ (HTH, p. 29). And this is precisely why one needs a superior ‘specie’ of man, who will search and undo the specific kind of values inscribed by way of god or the church in line, for example, with compassion, sympathy, mercy and love. Contra Christian morality, the heroic man that haunts Nietzsche’s mind, is not that far from his ‘tragic’ man, namely his depiction and portrayal of Dionysus, the hero who is so much happier than Apollo –the latter knowing always nothing of excess, joy, dance, and laughter. This is why terms such as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ make sense only when seen against the backdrop of the individual’s morality, his wills, and desires, so to speak

(HTH, p.58, 75). The tragedy, in short, of the kind of man Nietzsche talks about (paradoxically Homer and Aeschylus seem also to have ‘gone mad’ at some point), consists in that he, the ‘superhuman’, fails to postpone his work; that is he is always in a rush’ (HTH, p. 94-95).

Accordingly, Dionysus is a superb, an almost perfect analogy, of the morality Nietzsche envisages –though later on he denied that usefulness. Yet Dionysus is blasphemous, courageous and bold, belonging to the kind of aristocratic morality that suits the men ‘who create values’, rather than those who are possessed by a ‘slave morality’ of the type promoted by Judeo-Christian religion and the rationale of Enlightenment and episteme.

A similar kind of heroism is better captured by Nietzsche’s other famous study, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (TSZ). As an explicit and rather typical, to a certain extent, Nietzschean obsession with value-making, *the will to power* (of Zarathustra), is simply meant to reverse and radically alter the ‘table’ on which the slave morality is inscribed; it means in other words to create its own values’ (TSZ, p. 25). That is pretty much the meaning of ‘eternal return’ as well and what Nietzsche demands regarding god: namely that ‘god is dead’ (TSZ: 46). Death, by the same token, any death to be sure, but the death of god in particular, goes hand in hand, with another of Nietzsche’s well-entrenched propositions, that is the fact that ‘each one of us needs to overcome himself’ (TSZ: 61). Overall then if something is at stake in Nietzsche’s heroic depiction of myth, has to do more with the will to power that ‘sets everyone a free man’ (TSZ: 83), rather than any will to truth –god forbid!

Is ‘closeness, episode and heroism’ then the only problems of myth? Not necessarily, but I want to propose now that another kind of theorization is still possible. It may deliver, as a matter of fact, some truly productive and nuanced interpretations that obey ‘openness’ rather than closeness, ‘differential repetition’ rather than episode, and ‘origami spatialities’ rather than heroism –and all that on the back of myth. In so doing, I will be, strictly speaking, follow Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari, not because they directly refer to myth, but mostly to the extent that they take seriously the task of deconstruction and difference. In the next section therefore, I deconstruct the closeness of myth, by taking on another system, that of gift, that was also meant to be closed, but after Derrida’s (1992) laborious reconstruction, was found remarkably susceptible and willing to obey openness. In the final two sections I do not regret to perform another similar attack on myth’s episodic heroism, by taking up on Deleuze and Guattari’s lines of flight of origami, schizoanalysis, and repetition.

### **In Prison (of) with gift: openness**

Can myth be seen as a gift which is not present or given, a gift which is not recognized as such? Such is the radically different meaning and question Derrida’s work asks and rather reserves or conveys for the gift. I mean, is myth, like gift, if there is such, something one cannot make a present of, however willing one is to give

“that rest of the rest of which [one] cannot make a present” (Derrida, 1992: 4)? Myth after all, in Vernant’s theory is about a structure that allows Greek polis ‘ticking over’. But is there really a certain in-compatibility between myth and reason, like Vernant assumes? Looking, more carefully, at the relation between gift-exchange and economy, maybe proved helpful here. For example, it deserves to be mentioned that “One cannot treat the gift, this goes without saying, without treating this relation to economy, even to money economy. But is not the gift, if there is any, also that which interrupts economy?” (Derrida, 1992: 7). Indeed the gift, on the one hand, presupposes a certain exchange within specific temporal limits, yet on the other hand, when this happens its truly uneconomic character is irreversibly annulled and irretrievably eroded. Little wonder then, that “It is perhaps in this sense that the gift is the impossible” (Derrida, 1992: 7), to the extent that the one who receives a gift needs to return another gift, preferably not the present he received. In that return however, the gift never truly interrupts economic exchange, whether it is altruistic, friendly or pure. On the other hand, should not the gift be treated in such a way as if it did not have to be returned within the temporal limits of an obligatory exchange or gesture? It feels that the answer should be yes. Indeed, “In any case, time, the ‘present’ of the gift, is no longer thinkable as a now, that is, as a present bound up in the temporal synthesis” (Derrida, 1992: 9), insofar as, in order to be a gift, “there must be no reciprocity, return, exchange, counter gift or debt” (Derrida, 1992: 12). For “If the present is present to him as *present*, this simple recognition suffices to annul the gift. Why? Because it gives back, in the place, let us say, of the thing itself, a symbolic equivalent” (Derrida, 1992: 13). Hence, as soon as the gift is revealed as presence, there is no gift; on the other hand, once the gift is not spoken, given or exchanged, there is no gift either. “If there is no gift, there is no gift, but if there is a gift held or beheld as gift by the other, once again there is no gift; in any case the gift does not exist and does not present itself. If it presents itself, it no longer presents itself” (Derrida, 1992: 15). The gift, therefore, must keep its asymmetrical and ambivalent character, staying out of time and exchange, for “From the moment the gift would appear as a gift, as such, as what it is, in its phenomenon, its sense and its essence, it would be engaged in a symbolic, sacrificial or economic structure that would annul the gift in the ritual circle of the gift” (Derrida, 1992: 23).

Against the horizon of such an ambivalent undercurrent, the unbecoming essence of the closeness of myth, I am convinced is rendered imperceptibly apparent. Like Mauss who, “does not worry enough about this incompatibility between gift and exchange or about the fact that an exchanged gift is only a tit for tat, that is, an annulment of the gift” (Derrida, 1992: 37), Vernant, fails to see the openness and non-hierarchical nature of myth. Myth in other words *is never, as such*. As soon as it is what it is, that is recognized *as such*, it ceases to act as and to be worth of his name. “It only is by being able to be, *perhaps*, what it is” (Derrida, 1992: 87). Myth is at once “double annulment, double circle and double annulus of the annulment” (Derrida, 1992: 115). Such a withheld, postponed, suspended and unacknowledged myth is about a form of thought opened up by that which “must not be *bound*, in its

purity, nor even *binding*, obligatory or obliging” (Derrida, 1992: 137). This is the secret of myth.

To be sure myth still reflects the social hierarchy of polis. Yet myth can “give [only] in the measure of the incalculable: therefore only a hypothesis of counterfeit money would make the gift possible” (Derrida, 1992: 157). Myth, in the light of the above, is an aporia after all. It should be “a love *without reserve*” (Derrida, 1995: 106), like Homer’s poems. But only insofar as “one must give without knowing, without knowledge or recognition, without *thanks* [*remerciement*]: without anything, or at least without any object” (Derrida, 1995: 112).

One could argue, therefore, that if myth remains bound to the concealed rationality of dialectics, poeticity, and reason, this is not because it is other from philosophy, but because it is no other than philosophy. But only, once it is appreciated, however, that “*The thing itself is a sign*” (Derrida, 1976: 49), and that philosophy is but another myth; it is then that the alleged closeness of myth deconstructs. Myth in other words, does not exist within a “community immediately present to itself, without difference, a community of speech where all members are within earshot” (Derrida, 1976: 136) like Vernant would say. Myth, on the contrary, *takes place* between the two poles of *Εστία* and *Ερμής*. It does not privilege the one over the other. It guarantees their togetherness but only as double bind and irreducible split, which does not wound their disjointure. For the two poles are preserved and erased at once, to the extent that “in a single gesture, but doubled” myth “read[s] and write[s]” (Derrida, 1981: 64). Hence the *undecidable* of myth and hence the openness I seek. Myth, at last, like “The essence of *pharmakon* lies in the way in which, having no stable essence, no ‘proper’ characteristics, it is not, in any sense (metaphysical, physical, chemical, alchemical) of the word, *a substance*. The *pharmakon* has no ideal identity: it is aneidetic, firstly because it is not monoeidetic” (Derrida, 1981: 119–129).

### **Deleuze and Differential Repetitions**

If myth is manifold and multiple, rather than closed and balanced, one could use Deleuze’s proposition and try to think of difference independently of the various forms of representation that often ‘catch hold of it by means of analogy or representation’ (Deleuze, 1994: 24). Rather than being episodic or heroic, thus, the difference myth makes should be neither conceptual, nor representational but instead singular at the levels of Ideas and repetitive. Myth, in a certain Nietzschean sense, should not be mediated (a means, a message, an idea etc.), but, instead, should be the object of affirmation and excess, even when it returns, “for eternal return affirmed in all its power, allows no installation of a foundation – ground” (Deleuze, 1994: 67). As a consequence, myth escapes the anthropological trap of unity, identity and fixity being simply and purely composed of other differences that are not already contradictions –but not in the sense of Lévi-Strauss’ episodic conception of primitives or even Freud’s taboo study. For “It is not difference which presupposes opposition

but opposition which presupposes difference” (Deleuze, 1994: 51), (between *Εστία* and *Ερμής*) to the extent that difference is “light, aerial and affirmative” (Deleuze, 1994: 54), denying the “primacy of original over copy, of model over image” (Deleuze, 1994: 66).

Deleuze’s (1994) ‘differential repetition’ does not renounce myth thus. Difference in Deleuze, neither refers to objects placed under the same concept, nor is it about the generality or similarity of objects classified according to a concept. Rather a differential repetition changes something in the mind which contemplates it, to the extent that difference in-Itself is “already repetition” (Deleuze, 1994: 124), especially from the moment myth is not the same for all people, nor is everyone entitled to the same aspects, degrees, variations and differentiations of myth –i.e. the tragic hero dies but the message of myth is about avoiding death. Taking myth as a representative of heroism however “fails to capture the affirmed world of difference” (Deleuze, 1994: 55), which is neither the one of episode, nor the same of closeness but instead what “*lies between repetitions*” (Deleuze, 1994: 76). A repetition of myth, therefore, (the same myth on and on and on) is not about the same myth repeated or constantly reinstated across the Greek world; it is not about what returns, but instead “a force of affirmation, [which] affirms everything of the multiple, everything of the different, everything of chance *except* what subordinates them to the One, to the Same, to necessity, everything *except* the One, the Same and the Necessary” (Deleuze, 1994: 115). For “*Repetition is a condition of action before it is a concept of reflection*” (Deleuze, 1994: 90).

When myth is seen, therefore, as a multiplicity that refers to other differences that differentiate rather than identify a place with a certain identity, Deleuze’s differential calculus of Ideas becomes all the more pertinent. For after all, myth, involves “Ideas [that] are differentials of thought [...] a differential calculus corresponding to each Idea, an alphabet of what it means to think” (Deleuze, 1994: 181). For, truly, “everything bathes in its difference” (Deleuze, 1994: 243), in the same way, the true difference of myth like the ‘throw of a dice’ returns not in the same or in an identical manner, but in a way which affirms chance, infinity, chaos and osmosis –and this is something missed by Nietzsche’s tragic man and his portrayal of Apollo and Dionysus. Can one, at least, assume that myth is of Greek origin? Yes, insofar as one accepts, at the same time, that any origin is an origin of another origin and so on, in a certain *grammatological* way (Derrida, 1976; Wittgenstein, 1993). Myth is original, therefore, but only to the extent that it concerns another myth, a myth of myth (infinite), which in turn refers to and is associated with variations of ‘intensity’ and ‘scrambles’ or ‘dispositifs’ (Lyotard, 1993).

Myth, from a similar perspective, it can be argued, works in the same manner a fold operates. For, “A fold is always folded within a fold, like a cavern in a cavern” (Deleuze, 1993: 6). This is why when myth is conceived as representation, it blocks and ultimately erodes the unfolding of differences and the hope of any deconstructive



account of writing difference in a manner which will not dash or stave off ‘otherness’. Yet “The problem is not how to finish a fold, but how to continue it, to have it go through the ceiling, how to bring it to infinity” (Deleuze, 1993: 34). Myth, therefore, is about an event which “is a vibration with an infinity of harmonics or submultiples, such as an audible wave, a luminous wave, or even an increasingly smaller part of space over the course of an increasingly shorter duration” (Deleuze, 1993: 77). In the light of the above, all differences, even that of myth should be taken as a process that *takes place* amid a zone of indiscernibility and a zone of undecidability, passing between material perceptions and idealistic conceptualizations. A differential repetition of myth would then have to start “from *action*, that is, to say from our faculty of effecting changes in things, a faculty attested by consciousness and towards which all the powers of the organized body are seen to converge” (Bergson, 1970: 67). Such is the resonance of any myth.

For truly there is nothing hidden or masked in myth. Unless, of course, “The masks do not hide anything except other masks” (Deleuze, 1994: 17). The conclusion to be drawn from the above examples is simply that myths are affirmative of the multiple, the repetitive, the simulacrum, the unlimited and the dynamic, rather than closed, episodic and heroic.

Having laboured a philosophy of myth, which is not about the One, the Many, the Analogous, and the Representational, I will keep reinscribing Myth on the plane of affirmative differentiation and becoming that withdraws before any permanent and final decision (of the meaning of myth) takes place.

### **Deleuze and the Fold**

Deleuze’s notion of the fold fits the above assumption on the openness, differential and unsettling character of myth. Myth when seen as fold, we said before, captures incisively the transformation and trajectory that ceaselessly marks the shifting attitude of people toward the Greek polis. Being a fold, above all, means that myth is *pointless*, which comes down to saying, not that it is without meaning, but that it is not made or composed of points. Instead myth, like “Space, place and dwelling [...] comprise *pointless points*” (Doel, 1996: 423). The split between myth and philosophy is not reproduced, therefore, but suspended, insofar as to reproduce “implies the permanence of a fixed point of view that is external to what is reproduced: watching the flow from the back” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 36). Yet a fold takes up on myth in a way that unfolds and refolds, or in a similar way a myth is turned into both a lesson and a funny story; or into history and science; diegesis and remembrance; matter and memory; script and oral history. In an attempt to remain faithful to the meaning and experience of folding, therefore, Deleuze takes sides not with reproduction but with the notion of *following* inasmuch as “following is something different from the ideal of reproduction. Not better, just different” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 36). ‘Following’ then subtracts myth from a fully deployed situation that is, from the One of history (contradiction), or the One of anthropology (poetics)

reducing from the  $n$ th power ( $n-1$ ) and lending consistency to spacing and becoming. For truly, becomings do away “with all integral, molar and majoritarian categories [...] Becoming is therefore a radicalization of relations, of the spacing of relations, and of relationship space, wherein the conjunctive ‘and’ takes all” (Doel, 1996: 426, 427). This is why one has to deconstruct myth (any myth) “by force of restraint at the level of dimensions already available by making  $n-1$ ” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 10).

As Deleuze and Guattari put it in association with the rhizome:

“[it]connects any point with any other point, and none of its features necessarily refers to features of the same kind. It puts into play very different regimes of signs and even states of non-signs. The rhizome does not allow itself to be reduced to the One, or the Many. It is not the One that becomes two or that might become three, four or five etc. [...] It has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle, through which it pushes and overflows. It constitutes linear multiplicities in  $n$  dimensions without subject or object, which can be laid on a plane of consistency and from which the One is always subtracted ( $n-1$ )” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 47–48).

To put it in a nutshell, thus, a rhizome is what comes between myth and philosophy, for the “rhizome does not begin and does not end but is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, *intermezzo*” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 57).

In the light of this, “Difference does not separate, detach, divide, split, shed, fragment or cast-off” (Doel, 1993: 379), but marks the ceaseless spacing that keeps under continuous suspense, threat and regret any kind of separation between folds and myths. For folds are not simply divided, but perpetually folded around other folds growing, expanding and leaking in all possible directions, like an irreducible difference-producing repetition that opposes not a substance or a trait but the opposition between substances and traits. A fold, moreover, is not immobile or static. It can be seen, instead, in terms of a flow “that no longer belong to the one, nor the other but constitute the asymmetrical becoming of the two” (Deleuze and Parnet, 1983: 82). Myths of fold; folds of myth; or else, the rhizome that de-limits, re-cites and re-inscribes myth and its practice without pinning down, naming or pigeonholing difference.

Such a movement of writing mythical difference is also based on another turn of Deluzian philosophy; namely the effective ‘origami’ (fold paper), which is composed of events, rhizomes and folds. It can usefully explain, with reference to myth, how the undisclosed potentials of the conjunctive AND, cannot separate myth from philosophy. For “whenever there is an ‘and’ there is never a clean-cut separating distinct and immutable term” (Doel, 1996: 422). It is hard to tell therefore, which part of myth is closed, or open, mobile or static, superior or inferior like Vernant does. Myth’s outside is already that which is inside. Unlike Vernant’s understanding of myth’s hierarchy, when myth is seen in terms of a fold such a hierarchy does not make sense. If myth resembles a trace, though a supplement or a graphe of incalculably blurred, blended and intermingled folds, which is precisely about what

the conjunctive ‘and’ and ‘origami’ stand for, that is, “this new-found emphasis on the affective power of joint-action” (Doel, 2000: 118), then one must understand that each part of myth is always in the middle of the other in the same way that “the world is always in the middle of things” (Doel, 1996: 424). To quote from Deleuze (1983) once again:

“The AND, as something which has its place between the elements or between the sets. AND, AND, AND – stammering. And even if there are two parts in town, there is an AND between the two, which is neither the one nor the other, nor the one which becomes the other, but that which constitutes a multiplicity. For the conjunctive *and* does not form “a dialectical opposition, but opposition to the dialectic itself: differential affirmation against dialectical negation, against all nihilism and against this particular form of it” (Deleuze, 1983: 17).

Such is the meaning of myth once (the) meaning of origami is taken seriously. Such is also how a molecularly differential writing of myth works and this is why myth is always suspicious of historical, materialist, anthropological and other molar types of resistance, which are associated with small groups, pure identities, gift exchanges and authentic remote places. Conceiving of myths as a premature phase of philosophy is neither creative nor affirmative nor for the same reason productive. Small groups as Deleuze should warn, after all, are full:

“[...] of micro-fascisms that exist in a social field without necessarily being centralized in a particular State apparatus. We have left the shores of rigid segmentation and entered a realm that is no less organized where each one plumbs his own black hole, thereby becoming dangerous, confident about his own situation, his role, his mission. This is even more disturbing than the certitudes of the first live: Stalins of little groups, neighborhood, dispensers of justice, the micro-fascisms of gangs etc. [...] We have been interpreted as saying that for us the schizophrenic is the true revolutionary. We believe rather that schizophrenia is the collapse of a molecular process into a black hole. Marginal groups have always been the object of fear and sometimes of horror. They are not so clandestine” (Deleuze and Parnet, 1983: 98).

It is worth recalling once again with Deleuze that “Becomings belong to geography they are orientations, directions, entries and exits” (Deleuze and Parnet, 1987: 2), rather than being assigned to historical or anthropological grounds. The effective origami unfolds myth and complicates official and monumental interpretations of time and history. For as Deleuze and Guattari point out with respect to myth there is “nothing to understand, nothing to interpret” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 4), except from the fractal and spectral effects of speed and slowness, and the events that *will have been* – untimely. Origami irradiates, therefore, through its folds, rhizomes and plateaus, a fascination for an infinite multiplicity – the simplest question in the origamic universe being always, *does this multiplicity or this myth work for you?* If not, then take another fold, or unfold an already existent one, but in a manner which is simply worthy. Folding, refolding and unfolding. Such is the resonance of origami and the differential repetitions that crack, cut open and seep through the evental, unknown and undecidable myths.

## **Conclusion**

Any philosophy that sets out to deconstruct myth needs to be extremely cautious. Deconstructing myth, means only to make space for a “thought that would *affirm* life instead of a knowledge that is opposed to life” (Deleuze, 1983: 101); for to “*affirm is not to take responsibility for, to take on the burden of what is, but to release, to set free what lives*” (Deleuze, 1983: 185).

Hence, the task of deconstruction that is neither to represent, nor to interpret or make sense of the Old Town problem, but simply and purely to allow “all those particular intervals that open up the forced stabilization and self-identity of what appear to be points” (Doel, 2000: 120). This is why Greek mythology with its social rhetoric is “nothing but bands of intensity, potentials, thresholds and gradients” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 19). Meanwhile, everywhere, myth is a transformer and deformer of social relations, signs and identities.

If myth, generally as a mode of thought, therefore, is worthy of the decompressed events of dissemination, deconstruction, schizoanalysis and the event, this is because the motionless trips and Mobius bands of difference, affirm the relations that come between myth and philosophy suspending, postponing and withdrawing from any permanent contradiction between the two. For such is the effective power of origami when composed of folds, rhizomes and plateaus, which are always already interrupted, in a manner in which affirms dis-junction, heterogeneity and postponement; or insofar as difference “is always an undecidable and irreducible double [...] suspend[ing] itself between these two possibilities” (Doel, 1992: 166). Betweenness though “does not designate a localizable relation ‘going’ from one thing to the other and back again but a perpendicular direction, a transversal movement that sweeps the one and the other away, a stream without beginning or end that undermines its banks and picks up speed in the middle” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 25). Once this double bind is set in motion, the spaces of myth (of closeness, episode and heroism) is no longer about opposition, contradiction or negation but about everything that stutters, stammers and trembles; in a nutshell: *myth, recall, is not what you think.*

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